Model Driven Architecture is an approach to increasing the quality of complex software systems based on creating highlevel system models and automatically generating system architectures from the models. We show how this paradigm can be specialized to what we call Model Driven Security.
INTRODUCTION
Many processes are security critical in the sense that security requirements are a central part of process requirements and security mechanisms are required for their realization.
Examples range from the authorization of a military engagement, to an enterprise purchase process, to even the coordination of the sequence of user interface masks displayed to a user.
In such examples, the security policy can be quite complex and may be comprised of a collection of requirements, which are associated with different points of execution and checked and enforced at these points. If we view a process abstractly as being characterized by system modes or states, then the policy is defined and enforced over a sequence of states in a run of the process. This is because the policy itself may stipulate how the process evolves over time, i.e., what state transitions are allowed, since the transitions permitted depend on information available in the different states (e.g., in an enterprise purchase process), or because the policy itself must be implemented in various steps (e.g., a nuclear launch requiring authorization along a chain of command).
for specifying secure systems. UMLsec allows one to annotate different UML diagrams with security requirements, which can then be validated using formal verification techniques. In contrast, we focus on specifying access control requirements in class and state chart diagrams and develop tool support to automatically generate systems obeying these requirements.
Finally, in [11] we introduced the modeling language SecureUML. In our current work we have both simplified and generalized the formalism and introduced the concept of dialects. The major difference though is that [11] uses class diagrams as a system modeling language and generates security infrastructures for distributed components conforming to the Enterprise JavaBeans standard [12] , whereas in the current work we focus on process modeling and generate process controllers. The two works are complementary and together they suggest the wide scope of SecureUML and the idea of model driven security.
Organization. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of relevant aspects of UML and we introduce a UML-based process design language. We define SecureUML in Section 3 and integrate it into our process design language by defining a SecureUML dialect in Section 4. We give an example policy in Section 5 and explain the generation of secure web applications (based on Java Servlet) from modeled policies in Section 6. In Section 7, we report on experience and draw conclusions.
THE UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE
In UML [13] , the structural aspects of systems are defined in terms of classes, each formalizing a set of objects with common services, properties, and behavior. Services are described by methods, properties by attributes and associations, and the behavior can e.g., be characterized by a state machine that is attached to a particular class. Additional constraints can be given using expressions in the Object Constraint Language (OCL).
UML can serve as foundation for building domain specific languages by defining stereotypes, which introduce new language primitives by subtyping UML core types, and tagged values, which represent new properties of these primitives.
Model elements are assigned to such types by labeling them UML can also be used as metamodeling language, where UML diagrams are used to formalize the abstract syntax of another (modeling) language. We define SecureUML in this way because it allows us to use object-oriented concepts in our language definition.
Example: A Process Design Language
We now give an example of a process design language using In our example, AssembleOrder is the state where club members can browse through the club catalog, add items to their order, or remove them. The state SpecialOffers accesses special offers, which are restricted to "gold members" or to users whose current order is more than 100 d. In the state OrderInfo, additional data is processed, like the delivery address.
As the paper proceeds, we will use this as a running example to show how the requirement for restricted access tructures can be generated that enforce such a policy. SecureUML, which we introduce next, will provide the foundation for expressing such a policy.
SecureUML
We now define the syntax and semantics of SecureUML.
Moreover, as we will use SecureUML to create visual models (like in UML), we will also endow it with a notation (e.g., icons, strings, or geometric figures). To distinguish the two kinds of syntax, we will call the underlying syntax the abstract syntax and the notation the concrete syntax. We give examples of concrete syntax in Section 5. Figure 2 presents the metamodel that defines the abstract syntax of SecureUML. The types User, Role, and Permission and the relations UserAssignment, PermissionAssignment, and
Abstract Syntax
RoleHierarchy are directly adopted from the proposed RBAC standard [4] . In the following we focus on our additions.
An AuthorizationConstraint is a logical predicate that is at- As we will see, the semantics of a permission defined on a composite action is that the right to perform the action implies the right to perform any of the (transitively) contained subactions. This semantics yields a simple basis for defining useful high-level actions. Suppose the security pol-icy grants a role the permission to "read" an entity. Using an action hierarchy, we can unambiguously formalize this by stipulating that such a permission includes the permission to read the value of every entity attribute and to execute every side-effect-free method of the entity. Another reason for introducing action hierarchies is that they simplify the development of generation rules as it is sufficient to define these rules only for atomic actions.
The concrete resource types, their actions, and the action hierarchy are defined as part of a SecureUML dialect, which
integrates SecureUML with a system development language.
In Section 4 we will present a dialect that combines SecureUML with our process design language.
Semantics
SecureUML formalizes access control decisions that depend both on the static assignments of users and permissions to roles and on the satisfaction of authorization constraints in the current system state. The tricky bit in defining the semantics is formalizing the satisfaction of a constraint relative to the system state, which varies over time.
To accomplish this, we represent the system state at a time point t by a first-order structure S(t). An authorization constraint can be expressed as a formula in first-order logic over a signature Σ, which is determined by the system model.
The question of whether a user u is allowed to perform an action a can then be cast as the logical decision problem S(t) |= φAC(u, a), formalizing that access should be granted if and only if φAC(u, a) is satisfied in S(t). The formula φAC(u, a) is built from the constraints that are assigned to permissions and depends on the static assignments of users and permissions to roles, designated as the access control configuration.
The basic elements of the access control configuration are the sets Users, Roles, Permissions, and Actions, each containing entries for every model element of the corresponding metamodel types User, Role, Permission, and Action. Over these sets, we have the relations U A ⊆ Users × Roles, P A ⊆ Roles×Permissions, and AA ⊆ Permissions×Actions, which contain tuples for each instance of the corresponding associations 2 in the abstract syntax of SecureUML. 2 We abbreviate the names of the associations in Figure 2 as Additionally, we define the partial order ≥ Roles as well as the partial order ≥Actions, on the sets of roles and actions respectively, where we write superior roles (or actions) on the left (bigger) side of the ≥-symbol. ≥ Role is given by the reflexive, transitive closure of the aggregation association RoleHierarchy on Role in Figure 2 and ≥Actions is defined analogously based on the aggregation association ActionHierarchy.
Given a system model (i.e., a UML model in our process modeling language), we define a signature Σ = (S, F, P ),
where S is a set of sorts, F is a set of typed function symbols (including constants), and P is a set of typed predicate symbols. S contains one sort for each class in the system model and additionally the sort Users, which represents the users of a system as defined in the access control config- which determines the permissions a user has for an action.
We also introduce the function constraint : Permissions → L Σ , which maps permissions to their associated constraints translated 3 into the first-order language over Σ, associating the formulae true with unconstrained permissions. In this setting, we define that at time t the user u is allowed to their capital letters. 3 Due to space restrictions we omit the translation rules from OCL to first-order logic. 
This means that access is granted if and only if the user u has a permission p for which the corresponding formula constraint(p) is valid at time t. Note that the disjunction over an empty set UAP results in the formula false.
A DIALECT FOR PROCESS DESIGN
As previously noted, SecureUML is general in that it leaves open the nature of protected resources. The general scheme for combining SecureUML with a system design language is to formalize a dialect, which identifies primitives of the system modeling language as SecureUML resources and assigns them atomic and composite actions (which are given by an action hierarchy). Hence, to combine SecureUML with the proposed process design language, we define a dialect where we interpret a process type and the elements of its state machine as a hierarchy of protected resources and additionally define appropriate resource actions and an action hierarchy.
The abstract syntax of this dialect is defined by the metamodel shown in Figure 3 . We fix the elements Process, State and StatemachineAction as the protected resources, which is denoted by defining types for these primitives as subtypes of the base type Resource of the SecureUML metamodel (see Section 3.1).
We stipulate the actions offered by the resource types and the structure of the action hierarchy, shown in Table 1 , by defining OCL invariants on the resource types. For example, we define that each Process has the actions activate and activate recursive and that the composite action activate recursive for a process recursively includes the actions listed on all states of the process.
Action hierarchies, here and in general, support the definition of natural and concise security policies. For example, an activate recursive permission on a process grants a role the privilege to perform all actions on the process. Alternatively, the right to execute a single state machine action can be defined with the action execute.
AN EXAMPLE POLICY
In this section we explain our UML-based notation and illustrate the semantics of SecureUML using our running example.
An Example UML Model
In Figure 4 , we formalize a security policy where (1) We start by declaring the roles Member and GoldMember, which are represented by classes with the stereotype "secuml.Role" and define GoldMember as a subrole of Member.
Next, we define several permissions, each formalizing a requirement of the informal policy description. As Figure 4 suggests, a permission is represented by an association class with the stereotype "secuml. The formula that has to be satisfied by the structure S(t1) in order to grant Alice access is built according to the definition (2), given in Section 3.2. The constraint self.sum >= 100
on the permission MemberRestricted is translated into the formula sum(self Processes ()) ≥ Real 100 in the language defined by the signature Σ, and the formula for the permission GoldMember is true. The access decision is formalized as
which is satisfied.
Alternatively, suppose that Bob tries to perform this action at time t2. The corresponding structure S(t2) differs from S(t1) by the interpretation of the constant symbols 
GENERATION
We have implemented a prototype generator for the construction of secure web applications within the MDA-tool
ArcStyler [6] . This tool already provides a transformation function for converting UML classes and state machines into controller classes for web-applications, executed in a Java Servlet environment. Hence our task was to extend this function to generate a security infrastructure from SecureUML model elements.
Java Servlet [7] is a popular technology for developing web applications as it provides a rich environment for programming dynamic web pages. This technology supports RBAC; however its URL-based authorization scheme only enforces access control when a request arrives from outside the web server. This is ill-suited for modern web applications that are built from multiple servlets, with one acting as the central entry point to the application. This entry point servlet acts as a dispatcher in that it receives all requests and forwards them (depending on the application state) to the other servlets, which execute the business logic. The standard authorization mechanism only provides protection for the dispatcher. To overcome this weakness, we generate access control infrastructures that exploit the programmatic access control mechanism which servlets provide, where the role assignments of a user can be retrieved by any servlet.
We augmented ArcStyler's transformation function by a generation rule that produces Java assertions and adds them as preconditions to the methods for process activation, state activation, and action execution. These assertions are of the form
This rule is similar to Equation (2), which defines φAC(u, a) Comparing the code generated above with the example given in Section 5.2 shows that the declarative semantics of our models is preserved (under the operational semantics of Java) by the generation function. The user Alice is granted unrestricted access to the state by the first part of the assertion, whereas the right for the user Bob depends on the return value of the method getSum(), which is used to obtain the current value of the controller's attribute sum.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have carried out a number of small and medium scale experiments, specifying controllers for applications like online shopping and banking. Our experiments show that the combination of UML process models with a vocabulary based on RBAC, authorization constraints, and action hierarchies is expressive enough to naturally and concisely describe complex security policies. Hence, our proposal provides a concrete example of how to close the gap between design models (here process models) and security models.
The generative approach taken also closes another gap:
the one between system design and implementation. Doing so has a number of advantages. First, it guarantees the con- 
